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MARY AUGUSTA WARD’S “PERFECT ECONOMIST” 
AND THE LOGIC OF ANTI-SUFFRAGISM
bY EMILY COIT
In 1900, beatrice Webb asked her friend Mary Augusta Ward, better 
known as Mrs. Humphry Ward, to write the preface for her Case For 
the Factory Acts (1901), a collection of essays on industry and labor by 
women. In her preface, Ward announces that the volume “is written 
by a group of students and practical workers well acquainted with the 
subjects on which they speak; and at their head stands that brilliant 
writer, economist and historian, Mrs Sidney Webb.” Then, in a syntacti-
cally elaborate manoeuvre, Ward bends slowly into a posture of abject 
deference: “For one who, like myself, has no special knowledge of 
the great matters with which they deal, to dwell in terms of criticism 
or even of praise on the work of writers led and marshalled by one 
of the two authors of ‘Industrial Democracy’ would be impertinent 
and absurd.”1 In this performance of self-deprecation, this careful 
reference to Webb’s co-author and husband, and, most of all, this 
perceived threat of impertinence and absurdity lurking near “special 
knowledge” on the “great matters” of economics, there is a pattern of 
thinking that deserves our critical attention. A significant body of work 
on the politics of Ward and other late Victorian conservative women 
has developed in the last decade, explaining the often misunderstood 
relationship between their support for women’s higher education and 
their advocacy for the anti-suffrage cause, and identifying in their 
views a feminism that is no longer easily legible as such: a “difference 
feminism” that claims specific capacities and responsibilities for each 
of the sexes rather than equality between them.2 This article extends 
that body of scholarship by reading Ward’s Marcella (1894) with a 
focus on its treatment of economic learning and expertise, considering 
the novel in a context that also includes the economic thinkers Webb, 
John Ruskin, and Alfred Marshall. 
As we attempt to grasp the now-elusive logic of difference feminism, 
insights from the history of economic thought and from literary studies 
are mutually illuminating. Scholars interested in the way that Ward’s 
novels express her anti-suffrage views have tended (quite reasonably) 
to turn to the novel in which she treats suffrage most explicitly and at 
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greatest length, Delia Blanchflower (1914).3 We should note, however, 
that Delia Blanchflower’s discussion of suffrage returns repeatedly 
to the topics of women’s “economic independence” and economic 
subjection.4 Ward shows us her eponymous heroine, moreover, “trying 
to read Marshall’s ‘Economics of Industry’”; she refers here to the 
textbook written not just by Marshall but also by his wife, the some-
time economist Mary Paley Marshall.5 I want to suggest that Marcella, 
albeit in less overt ways, also engages with Marshall and the emerging 
academic discipline that he worked to establish, and that, as in Delia 
Blanchflower, this engagement with economics expresses ideas about 
relations between men and women. The novel, I contend, stages a 
comparison between gendered varieties of economic knowledge, and 
Ward’s representation of them is an articulation of the difference femi-
nism that informs her anti-suffrage stance. The centrality of economic 
knowledge in this articulation of difference feminism should provoke 
us to consider anew the force of ideas about economic learning within 
the thinking that shapes the british anti-suffrage movement. And the 
significance of economic learning in Ward’s thought, moreover, should 
draw our attention to Marshall’s remarkable role in the gendering of 
the academic discipline over which he presided; this role is generally 
acknowledged by historians of economic thought and higher educa-
tion, but remains less widely recognized in literary scholarship on the 
history of gender and feminism. 
During the era when Ward wrote her novels, “political economy,” 
a field of inquiry with roots in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, 
was becoming the professional, mathematicized academic discipline of 
“economics” that we now know. At the close of the twentieth century, 
feminist scholarship identified economics as “the most male of the social 
sciences.”6 “Home economics,” in contrast, has tended to be feminized 
and associated with primary, secondary, or vocational education rather 
than higher education and research.7 Of course, this gendered division 
of knowledge has a history: by the later nineteenth century, “political 
economy addressed itself to the public sphere while domestic economy 
remained in the private. In its expansion, the contrast was evident 
from the very form of the discourse: political economy took the form 
of a science dealing with the operation of laws, whereas domestic 
economy remained the art of managing household resources.”8 Ruskin 
plays subversively with these divergent meanings when he insists 
that “economics” must be understood as oeconomicus or oikonomia, 
which he translates as “House-law.”9 “Economy,” he declares, is “the 
administration of a house; its stewardship; spending or saving, that is, 
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whether money or time, or anything else, to the best possible advantage” 
(CW, 16:19). When he writes of a “perfect economist,” he is making 
reference to a woman, the “mistress of a household” who fosters justice 
and beauty through her habits of consumption (CW, 16:20). Ruskin’s 
attention to the female, domestic version of the economist, along with 
his preference for Xenophon’s Oeconomicus over more recent political-
economic writing, is part of his generally oppositional stance towards 
mainstream nineteenth-century political economy.
The gendering of professionalized economics is overdetermined and 
perhaps even inevitable, not least because professionalized academe 
as a whole was overwhelmingly male in its origins. but one historian 
of economic thought notes that “contrary to popular belief, women 
contributed more widely to economic debate in relative terms in the 
initial years of the professionalization of the subject in England, than 
they have done ever since”; it was during the twentieth century that 
the proportion of published scholarly work by women in the discipline 
diminished.10 Marcella participates in the construction of the cultural 
context for that decline. H. G. Wells wrote archly of “the little shoal 
of young women who were led into politico-philanthropic activities 
by the influence of the earlier novels of Mrs Humphry Ward—the 
Marcella crop.”11 This reading will suggest that the influence Wells 
observes involves consequential assumptions about women’s work with 
“special knowledge” of the economic sort. 
Marcella tells the tale of the young, well-born Marcella boyce, who 
leaves her “Venturist” socialist circle in London to take up residence at 
her family’s rural estate when it unexpectedly comes into her father’s 
possession. She encounters obstacles in her efforts to improve the living 
conditions of tenants there, and accepts the marriage proposal of her 
dashing and politically prominent Tory neighbour in hopes that this 
union with the powerful Aldous Raeburn, Lord Maxwell of Maxwell 
Court, will give her new resources for doing good. Complications 
arise, however: when he is caught poaching, the poor laborer Jim 
Hurd shoots and kills the Raeburns’ gamekeeper. Marcella becomes 
increasingly entangled with the caddish, decadent Radical politician 
Harry Wharton, who defends Hurd in court. Distraught at Aldous’s 
refusal to rescue Hurd, whom she believes is a victim, she backs out 
of her engagement and gives herself over to the profession of nursing. 
After an edifying stint as a nurse in the London slums, Marcella finally 
returns to Aldous, this time for love. Her socialism moderated and 
her pride chastened, she looks ahead to a life of doing good in her 
new role as Lady Maxwell. Conspicuously engaged with the thought 
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of both Ruskin and Alfred Toynbee, Marcella comments on a startling 
number of the issues of its day: Fabian socialism, upper-class slum-
ming, and nursing as a profession for women, to name just a few. 
Judith Wilt calls it “the last of the great condition-of-England novels” 
and observes that by “soldiering on in the militancy of the stopgap 
. . . Marcella arrives at the closest thing to a political creed Ward can 
assert: that every important idea for a new social edifice—Christianity, 
the nation-state, socialism—is at best a moment in the transition to, 
well, probably something other than the blueprint it thinks it is working 
toward, the goal it thinks it seeks.”12 
Ward’s intensely topical book, which can be read as a bildungsroman 
about a New Woman who must decide how to spend her inher-
ited wealth, is notably preoccupied with questions about economic 
consumption and about women’s education. In these respects as in 
others, it is a rewriting of Middlemarch for the fin de siècle.13 Marcella’s 
attempts to educate herself on matters of economics recall those of 
George Eliot’s heroine. Dorothea, like Marcella, has “her particular 
little heap of books on political economy and kindred matters, out 
of which she was trying to get light as to the best way of spending 
money so as not to injure one’s neighbors, or—what comes to the same 
thing—so as to do them the most good”; she finds herself “twitted with 
her ignorance of political economy, that never-explained science which 
was thrust as an extinguisher over all her lights.” Her uncle Mr. brooke 
remarks to her, “Young ladies don’t understand political economy, you 
know.”14 Later in the century, the males in Marcella politely refrain 
from making such comment, but their superior knowledge is much 
more real than Mr brooke’s. And Marcella, like Middlemarch, care-
fully represents the difficulties of the female autodidact whose formal 
education has been limited because of her sex. 
The fact that Ward was a strident advocate for female education 
in addition to the anti-suffrage cause has seemed to many twentieth-
century readers at best intellectually incoherent and at worst shamefully 
hypocritical. Ward’s biographer John Sutherland notes that although 
she was “the moving spirit” in establishing Somerville College as a 
site for women’s education at Oxford in the late 1870s, by the next 
decade, “she had swivelled round to an intractable opposition to her 
sex’s emancipation.”15 More recent studies by beth Sutton-Ramspeck, 
Maroula Joannou, and Julia bush suggest, however, that Ward’s trajec-
tory was perhaps not so much a swivel as a straight line: her support 
for women’s higher education and her opposition to women’s suffrage 
both fit within her historically specific difference feminism.16 bush’s 
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work on the conservative women (including Ward) who both opposed 
suffrage and worked to found women’s colleges explains the logic 
that made these positions mutually supporting. “Far from accepting 
any inherent contradiction between championing women’s education 
and refusing them the vote,” she writes, “[Ward] argued that the 
two were directly connected”: “improvements in women’s education 
were regarded as a means of reinforcing women’s ordained role in 
society, and enhancing its influence without any dangerous claims to 
universal gender equality.”17 Ward’s Oxford friend Louise Creighton 
articulates this stance clearly: “[T]he wife and mother, the mistress of 
a household, can see no limit to her beneficent activities. To fit her 
for so wide a sphere, no education can be too high; she needs not the 
higher only but the highest, and she needs, above all, to continue her 
education through life.”18 In shedding light on the interconnected set 
of ideas that inform Ward’s advocacy for both female education and 
the anti-suffrage cause, work by bush and others suggests that that the 
novelist’s representations of female learning need to be understood as 
part of her argument about the vote.
Ward was proud of the work she did with Creighton to found 
Somerville; she recounts somewhat defensively in her memoir, A 
Writer’s Recollections (1918): “My friends and I were all on fire for 
women’s education . . . but hardly any of us were at all on fire for 
woman suffrage.” She explains that they believed “that the development 
of women’s power in the State—or rather, in such a state as England, 
with its far-reaching and Imperial obligations, resting ultimately on the 
sanction of war—should be on lines of its own.”19 Here Ward articulates 
the same argument against suffrage that appears in her influential 1889 
“Appeal against Female Suffrage,” which, Sutherland notes, “was a 
propaganda triumph, and in histories of british feminism is plausibly 
credited with helping hold back the cause of votes for women for 
years.”20 The “Appeal” declares: “While desiring the fullest possible 
development of the powers, energies, and education of women, we 
believe that their work for the State, and their responsibilities towards 
it, must always differ essentially from those of men.” Ward goes on to 
assert that the influence of women in politics “does . . . tell already, 
and will do so with greater force as women improved by education 
fit themselves to exert it more widely and efficiently. . . . [T]his moral 
influence . . . depends largely on qualities which the natural position 
and functions of women as they are at present tend to develop, and 
which might be seriously impaired by their admission to the turmoil 
of active political life. These qualities are, above all, sympathy and 
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disinterestedness.”21 Ward reiterates her argument on suffrage and 
sexual difference in the modern imperial state in two important anti-
suffrage texts from 1908, the Anti-Suffrage League manifesto in The 
Nineteenth Century and a piece for an American audience in the 
Ladies’ Home Journal. In the former, she writes: “Women are ‘not 
undeveloped men but diverse,’ and the more complex the develop-
ment of any State, the more diverse. Difference, not inferiority—it is 
on that we take our stand.”22 
Ward’s quotation here from Tennyson’s Princess (1847) gives voice 
to ideas also expressed in Ruskin’s Sesame and Lilies (1865). “We are 
foolish, and without excuse foolish, in speaking of the ‘superiority’ of 
one sex to the other, as if they could be compared in similar things,” 
Ruskin writes; “each has what the other has not: each completes the 
other: they are nothing alike, and the happiness and perfection of both 
depends on each asking and receiving from the other what the other 
only can give” (CW, 18:121). That Ruskin heavily influences Ward is 
well known. but Marcella’s representation of learning engages with 
Sesame and Lilies in ways that have not been fully recognized. A dual 
concern with political economy and female education characterizes 
both texts, and both texts locate their treatment of education in a 
discussion of reading and of libraries—or, as Ruskin calls them, “Kings’ 
Treasuries” (CW, 18:53).
As critics have noted, Ward calls upon autobiographical material 
in representing Marcella’s scattershot education and its effects.23 In 
a frequently quoted passage from her memoir, Ward testifies to the 
injustice of her early years: 
As far as intellectual training was concerned, my nine years from seven 
to sixteen were practically wasted. I learned nothing thoroughly or 
accurately, and the German, French, and Latin which I soon discovered 
after my marriage to be essential to the kind of literary work I wanted 
to do, had all to be relearned before they could be of any real use to 
me; nor was it ever possible for me—who married at twenty—to get 
that firm hold on the structure and literary history of any language, 
ancient or modern, which my brother William, only fifteen months my 
junior, got from his six years at Rugby, and his training there in Latin 
and Greek. (WR, 1:129–30)
Ward’s heroine endures a similar lack of education, especially compared 
to the men around her, and this causes her pain and humiliation. This 
humiliation plays out in Aldous’s study, which contains his personal 
library. Ward lavishes description upon this site in order to commu-
nicate the character of its owner: 
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The room was lined with books, partly temporary visitors from the 
great library downstairs, partly his old college books and prizes, and 
partly representing small collections for special studies. Here were a 
large number of volumes, blue books, and pamphlets, bearing on the 
condition of agriculture and the rural poor in England and abroad; 
there were some shelves devoted to general economics, and on a little 
table by the fire lay the recent numbers of various economic journals, 
English and foreign. between the windows stood a small philosophical 
bookcase.24
Aldous prefers these subjects (along with some poetry and some criti-
cism) over novels, the narrator tells us, because “[h]is mind was mostly 
engaged in a slow wrestle with difficult and unmanageable fact” (M, 90). 
When she is visiting Aldous’s home and getting to know him, we 
read, Marcella, “still nervous, went to look at the bookshelves, and 
found herself in front of that working collection of books on economics 
which Aldous kept in his own room under his hand, by way of guide to 
the very fine special collection he was gradually making in the library 
down stairs” (M, 139). Marcella’s agency notably diminishes over the 
course of this sentence: she actively goes to look at the books but then 
passively finds herself in front of them. There is a shift in scale here, 
moreover, in which the reader gathers that the first collection of books 
on economics is actually just a guide to a larger collection downstairs; 
this anticipates the analogous shift in scale that is imminent, in which 
Marcella realizes that the whole of her intellectual terrain is a tiny 
spot on a much vaster map. What had seemed a capacious expanse is 
suddenly and terribly revealed to be a meagre speck: 
Here again were surprises for her. Aldous had never made the smallest 
claim to special knowledge on all those subjects she had so often insisted 
on making him discuss. He had been always tentative and diffident, 
deferential even so far as her own opinions were concerned. And here 
already was the library of a student. All the books she had ever read or 
heard discussed were here—and as few among many. The condition of 
them, moreover, the signs of close and careful reading she noticed in 
them, as she took them out, abashed her: she had never learnt to read 
this way. It was her first contact with an exact and arduous culture. 
She thought of how she had instructed Lord Maxwell at luncheon. No 
doubt he shared his grandson’s interests. Her cheek burned anew; this 
time because it seemed to her that she had been ridiculous. (M, 139)
The language in this scene notably resembles the language that features 
in Ward’s Preface to Webb’s Factory Acts: in both cases, a lack of 
“special knowledge” on economic subjects—possessed by Webb in the 
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preface and by Aldous in the novel—makes the woman who presumes 
to share an opinion “impertinent and absurd” or, in this Marcella’s 
case, “ridiculous.” 
Ward’s emphasis on “close and careful reading” in this scene about 
Aldous’s “special knowledge” as revealed in his economics books recalls 
Ruskin’s stringent instructions in “Of Kings’ Treasuries” on the practice 
of “the kind of word-by-word examination of your author which is 
rightly called ‘reading’” (CW, 18:75). One must read, Ruskin advises, 
as an “Australian miner” works: “[T]he metal you are in search of 
being the author’s mind or meaning, his words are as the rock which 
you have to crush and smelt in order to get at it. And your pickaxes 
are your own care, wit, and learning; your smelting furnace is your 
own thoughtful soul. Do not hope to get at any good author’s meaning 
without those tools and that fire” (CW, 18:64). Ruskin’s right reading 
means constant attention to etymology: “Now, in order to deal with 
words rightly, this is the habit you must form. Nearly every word in your 
language has first been a word in some other language . . . retaining 
a deep vital meaning which all good scholars feel in employing them, 
even at this day” (CW, 18:68)—here we might think of Ward’s lack of 
the “German, French, and Latin which I soon discovered . . . to be 
essential to the kind of literary work I wanted to do.” Ruskin’s mention 
of “good scholars” of course implies that there are bad ones. Marcella’s 
burning cheek makes sense in the context of his declaration that “the 
entire difference between education and non-education (as regards 
the merely intellectual part of it) consists in this accuracy” of right 
reading, and adds that “the accent, or turn of expression of a single 
sentence, will at once mark a scholar. And this is so strongly felt, so 
conclusively admitted, by educated persons, that a false accent or 
mistaken syllable is enough, in the parliament of any civilized nation, 
to assign to a man a certain degree of inferior standing for ever” 
(CW, 18:65). As this last line makes explicit, Ruskin’s lecture is 
addressed to men. Marcella considers what “degree of inferior standing” 
such false moves might assign to a woman. 
When Ruskin states in the companion lecture addressed to women, 
“you may chisel a boy into shape, as you would a rock, or hammer 
him into it,” he evokes the Australian-miner pickaxe mode of reading 
and affirms it as a masculine practice. “but,” he continues, “you 
cannot hammer a girl into anything. She grows as a flower does.” 
Hence: “Let her loose in the library, I say, as you do a fawn in a field” 
(CW, 18:131). Aldous replicates Ruskin’s argument that male learning 
should be laborious, painstaking, and structured, whereas female 
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learning may be free, intuitive, and emotional; he writes to his friend 
of Marcella:
[Her] mind has all sorts of ability; comes to the right conclusion by 
a divine instinct, ignoring the how and why. What does such a being 
want with the drudgery of learning? to such keenness life will be 
master enough. Yet she has evidently read a good deal—much poetry, 
some scattered political economy, some modern socialistic books, 
Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, Carlyle. She takes everything dramatically, 
imaginatively, goes straight from it to life, and back again. (M, 91)
This view recalls Ruskin’s remark that “it is not the object of educa-
tion to turn the woman into a dictionary; but it is deeply necessary 
that she should be taught to enter with her whole personality into 
the history she reads; to picture the passages of it vitally in her own 
bright imagination; to apprehend, with her fine instincts, the pathetic 
circumstances and dramatic relations, which the historian too often 
only eclipses by his reasoning” (CW, 16:126). Ruskin and Aldous both 
understand women’s learning as an emotionally charged process of 
extending instinctive sympathy—and both value it as such. It is the 
counterpart to a masculine learning grounded in the “drudgery” of 
rationally and laboriously mining facts and arguments from text.
We should remember that Ruskin’s girl reader, wandering like a 
fawn in the library, safe in her inviolable innocence, figures within a 
statement that was understood in its own time as a strong endorse-
ment for women’s education, an exhortation to “let a girl’s education 
be as serious as a boy’s” (CW, 18:132).25 Ward herself seems to have 
experienced, and valued, some such fawnish wanderings when she 
secured a reader’s pass to the bodleian as a young woman in Oxford: in 
those years, she recalls in her memoir, “I had no definite teaching, and 
everything I learned came to me from persons—and books—sporadi-
cally, without any general guidance or plan. It was all a great voyage 
of discovery, organized mainly by myself, on the advice of a few men 
and women very much older, who took an interest in me and were 
endlessly kind to the shy and shapeless creature I must have been” 
(WR, 1:137). One of those older advisors was Mark Pattison; encour-
aged by him, she made herself an expert in medieval Spanish history 
and in 1883, as she reported to her mother, became the university’s 
“first woman examiner of men.” Nevertheless, Sutherland comments, 
“Surrounded all her adult life by the best-trained minds of her time, 
Mary was always bitter at the institutional neglect of her brain, simply 
because it was a female brain.”26 That bitterness finds expression both in 
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the account of Marcella’s searing humiliation when faced with Aldous’s 
books about economics and in the passage in her memoir about the 
“wasted” years of her youth. 
That passage notably mentions Webb. Having identified Webb as an 
exception in the 1901 preface to The Factory Acts, Ward does so again 
in her 1918 memoir. After describing her own inadequate education, 
she remarks on the “vast” changes in women’s lives since her youth, 
but adds the following: 
Exceptional women, of course, have led much the same kind of lives 
in all generations. Mrs. Sidney Webb has gone through a very different 
sort of self-education from that of Harriet Martineau; but she has 
not thought more widely, and she will hardly influence her world so 
much as that stanch fighter of the past. It is the rank and file—the 
average woman—for whom the world has opened up so astonishingly. 
(WR, 1:132) 
In what is more or less an aside, Ward compares Webb rather invidi-
ously with Martineau, another female economist. More significant, 
however, is the fact that in both preface and memoir Ward identifies 
Webb as an exemplary anomaly, one that permits her to draw a distinc-
tion between such an unusual case and “one who . . . has no special 
knowledge” (as she puts it in the preface) or “the rank and file—the 
average woman” (as she puts it in her memoir). “Exceptional women” 
have always been able speak authoritatively on matters related to their 
“special knowledge”; the great recent opening up has happened not 
for them but for “the average woman,” who previously (like the writer 
herself) has risked being “impertinent and absurd” or (like Marcella) 
“ridiculous”—in her attempts to participate in intellectual life. 
These ideas about the capacities and educations of women average 
and exceptional are part of Ward’s anti-suffrage thinking. She refers 
to the concept of the “exceptional” woman, along with “specialized 
knowledge,” in her 1908 article in The Nineteenth Century: “The 
modern State depends for its very existence . . . on the physical force 
of men, combined with the trained and specialized knowledge which 
men alone are able to get, because women, on whom the child-bearing 
and child-rearing of the world rest, have no time and no opportunity 
to get it. The difference in these respects between even the educated 
man and the educated woman—exceptions apart—is evident to us 
all.”27 Ward suggests that women’s childbearing ability will always 
necessarily prevent them from having time and opportunity, and thus 
that biology makes it impossible for women—“exceptions apart”—to 
1223Emily Coit
gain “trained and specialized knowledge.” For Ward, this essentially 
logistical problem is permanent and natural rather than socially deter-
mined and thus subject to change. Although Ward’s recourse to biology 
refers to women’s natural, permanent logistical difficulties rather than 
women’s natural, permanent intellectual inferiority, she nevertheless 
understands these biological facts to be firm. In her contribution to 
Ladies’ Home Journal during the same year, she refers to the “trained 
knowledge of the world and its affairs, which only men can get,” and 
clarifies that “it is their natural business to get it; they are not held 
back from getting it by the cares of the home and family; and, as 
far as we can see, it must always remain their business, by virtue of 
a natural selection, against which it is childish to fight.”28 A vote by 
women, she writes, would be “an ignorance-vote which is imposed by 
nature and irreparable.”29 
Ward’s mention of “natural selection” in her discussion of the imposi-
tions of “nature” is significant; her theory of gender rests on “difference, 
not inferiority,” but both here and in Marcella, her expressions of that 
theory borrow language from a Darwinian discourse that does believe 
women to be naturally intellectually inferior. These passing references 
draw from a body of thought within which race, evolution, imperialism, 
reproduction, and motherhood are closely interrelated matters: bush 
notes that “evolutionary discourse strengthened imperialist rhetoric 
and influenced the views of conservative women who believed that 
natural selection underlined the significance of women’s distinctive 
social role.”30 Language drawn from this evolutionary discourse also 
appears frequently in statements by Marshall. His biographer Peter 
Groenewegen notes that the economist “gained the belief in the relative 
mental inferiority of women from the pioneers of evolutionary theory 
themselves . . . [both Darwin and Spencer] explicitly argued women’s 
mental inferiority to men as a justification for a sexual division of labor 
which, in particular, had important implications for policies on women’s 
education.” Like many thinkers in his time, Groenewegen observes, 
Marshall understood “the family, and the necessary role of women in 
the family environment,” as the crucial basis for “race progress and 
national survival.”31
It is noteworthy that the books that provoke Marcella’s moment of 
humiliation are books in economics; and that the woman who stands 
out as the “exception” that proves the rule of women’s general unsuit-
ability for gaining “special knowledge” and thus suffrage is a woman 
whose “special knowledge” is economic. When we consider the way 
that economic knowledge serves in Ward’s work to point towards the 
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average woman’s limitations, it may be useful to keep in mind that in 
the years of it professionalization, the discipline was dominated by a 
thinker dedicated to preventing women from doing the kind of work 
he did. Amongst historians of higher education for women, there is 
consensus on the fact that Marshall did much to limit progress, notably 
authoring an influential pamphlet against the admission of women 
for degrees at Cambridge in 1896. His denouncement was especially 
powerful because he had supported women’s higher education in the 
1870s, and had in fact married one of his former students; his wife 
Mary Paley Marshall was an accomplished lecturer in political economy 
until she ceased teaching after Alfred took up his Cambridge chair.32 
Historians of economic thought also tend to agree on the subject of 
Marshall’s regrettable attitudes towards women; John Maynard Keynes 
refers to “a congenital bias” against women that by middle age had 
“gathered secret strength” in the economist.33 
Marshall’s influence in his discipline was considerable. His Principles 
of Economics, first published in 1890, served as the dominant text-
book in the field for the next four decades, and remained in use up 
through the mid-twentieth century. Upon his friend benjamin Jowett’s 
invitation, Marshall had replaced Toynbee as lecturer in political 
economy at balliol in 1882, after his predecessor’s premature death—a 
succession that David Reisman describes as an instance of “one social 
missionary relieving another while keeping the nature of the mission 
surprisingly unaltered.”34 (Ward, close with Toynbee and Jowett, had 
left Oxford during the previous year; she and Marshall—as well as 
Webb—moved in the same Oxford and London circles.)35 Marshall was 
shortly thereafter summoned to take up the chair of political economy 
at Cambridge in 1885. Throughout his career, he was a key figure in 
the professionalization of the discipline within the modern research 
university: Rita McWilliams Tullberg calls him the “chief spokesperson” 
for the discipline as it professionalized, noting that he shaped curricula 
at the newer universities as well as Cambridge and pointing to H. S. 
Foxwell’s 1888 remark that “half the economic chairs in the U.K. are 
occupied by [Marshall’s] pupils and the share taken by them in general 
economic instruction in England is even larger than this.”36 
Given that they moved in the same circles, it is perhaps not surprising 
that Ward’s “exceptional” woman would clash with Marshall. In her 
memoir, Webb gives a detailed account of that encounter. The two 
economic thinkers met in March 1889, when Webb—who was at that 
point Miss Potter—visited her friends the Creightons in Cambridge 
and conversed with Professor Marshall.37 The professor and Miss 
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Potter speak first about marriage; their “interesting talk,” she writes, 
begins “with chaff about men and women: he holding that woman 
was a subordinate being, and that, if she ceased to be subordinate, 
there would be no object for a man to marry.”38 “Hence,” Webb’s 
account continues, “the woman must not develop her faculties in a 
way unpleasant to the man . . . that rivalry in men’s pursuits was posi-
tively unpleasant. . . . Contrast was the essence of the matrimonial 
relation.” Webb reports that the economist laughs as he says, “‘If you 
compete with us we shan’t marry you.’” Upon hearing that Miss Potter 
intends to write a history of the consumer cooperative movement, 
Marshall tries to dissuade her: “[O]f course I think you are equal to 
a history of Co-operation,” he states, “but it is not what you can do 
best.” Urging her to focus instead on a study of “women’s labour,” he 
declares: “There are any number of men who could write a history 
of Co-operation, and would bring to this study of a purely economic 
question far greater strength and knowledge than you possess.”39 In 
writing a book on cooperation, he tells her, “you will be using faculties 
which are common to most men, and given to a great many among 
them in a much higher degree. A book by you on the Co-operative 
Movement I may get my wife to read me in the evening to while away 
the time, but I shan’t pay any attention to it.”40 
Webb explicitly links Marshall’s understanding of her abilities as 
an economic thinker to Ward’s views on suffrage, commenting on this 
anecdote, “I suspect what lay at the bottom of Professor Marshall’s 
high opinion of my unique qualifications for the alternative question of 
woman’s labour, namely, that I was at that time known to be an anti-
feminist. In the spring of 1889 I took what afterwards seemed to me a 
false step in joining with others in signing the then notorious manifesto, 
drafted by Mrs. Humphry Ward and some other distinguished ladies, 
against the political enfranchisement of women.”41 Webb refers here 
to Ward’s “Appeal,” which was published in the June following these 
Cambridge chats with Marshall. During that same June, both Webb 
and Marshall attended the Annual Co-operative Congress at Ipswich. 
There, Marshall gave the Inaugural Address, and he and Webb once 
again skirmished on the subject of “men and women.”42 In conversation 
with others, the professor moved to defend Webb against criticism of 
her support for the “Appeal,” stating to her critics (as she records it), 
“Miss Potter sees what the women suffrage people do not see; that if 
women attempt to equal men and be independent of their guidance 
and control, the strong woman will be ignored and the weak woman 
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simply starved. It is not likely that men will go on marrying if they are 
to have competitors for wives. Contrast is the only basis of marriage.”43 
Marshall sees a function for competition in the marketplace, but not 
in the home. His perfect economist is male because a female economist 
would mean “competition” or “rivalry” between the sexes, rather than 
a cooperative arrangement in which the abilities and achievements of 
each complement those of the other. He shares Ruskin’s view of the 
sexes, believing that “each has what the other has not: each completes 
the other” (18:121). As we have seen, Ward also shares that view, and 
she too identifies “sex-rivalry” as the dire consequence of women’s 
misguided quest for equality.44 Marshall, following Darwin, did actu-
ally understand women to be intellectually inferior; but the argument 
he expresses to Webb does not focus upon such inferiority. Rather, 
he focuses on this kind of rivalry or competition, and he emphasizes 
that women should not be economists because allowing women to 
take on the work of men would destroy the institution of marriage 
as it then existed. (About this, it should be noted, Marshall was not 
wrong.) Webb’s narrative of these spats with Marshall forms a sugges-
tive backdrop to the humiliations Marcella endures in the presence of 
Aldous’s economics books and journals; and it usefully suggests that as 
we try to understand the novel’s treatment of economic knowledge, 
we should also be thinking about its treatment of marriage. 
On her path to the marriage that concludes her Bildung, Marcella 
engages with economic questions by devising various schemes to help 
the poor. These schemes manifest a strategy of experiment: they are 
temporary, imperfect, flexible plans to do good in a time of transition, 
and they are driven by a powerful emotional response to the sight of 
human pain. Marcella remarks to Aldous about one such scheme: “[I]t 
may turn out to be a mistake. but—whatever happens—whatever any 
of us, Socialists or not, may hope for in the future—here one is with 
one’s conscience, and one’s money, and these people, who like oneself 
have but the one life!” (M, 523). Acting immediately, she implies, is 
more important than determining the perfect action. Confronted with 
suffering, she feels compelled to address it. To Lord Maxwell, she 
explains: “It is when I go down from our house to the village; when 
I see the places the people live in . . . if I don’t do something—the 
little such a person as I can—to alter it before I die, I might as well 
never have lived.”45 She also says to him, “Of course, you think me 
very ridiculous . . . but it can’t make any difference to one’s feeling: 
nothing touches that” (M, 131). Thinking back on this conversation 
only a short time later in Aldous’s library, Marcella’s cheek will burn 
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as she feels “she had been ridiculous” (M, 139). but here, in the 
conversation itself, she designates a way out of that ridiculousness: her 
female “feeling,” untouchable and impervious to male critique, makes 
her ridiculousness irrelevant. 
In order to do good by acting upon “feeling,” Marcella requires a 
certain autonomy. As she proposes to Aldous that her private philan-
thropic spending will substitute (temporarily) for larger-scale labor 
unionization, she asks him, “What ought to prevent my free will 
anticipating a moment—since I can do it—that we all want to see?” 
(M, 523). This individual “free will” is central to Marcella’s strategy for 
doing good, and Ward’s novel intervenes conspicuously in a contem-
porary debate that pits individualism against collectivism, the former 
associated with the confident laissez-faire principles of the earlier 
nineteenth century and the latter with socialism and the emerging 
welfare state.46 Sutton-Ramspeck and Nicole b. Meller note that 
Ward expresses her pragmatic gradualism regarding individualist free 
will as the partner of collectivism elsewhere as well, pointing to her 
remark that “irregular and individualistic experiments are the neces-
sary pioneers and accompaniments with us of all collective action.”47 
As they observe, the novel’s statement on the proper balance between 
individualism and collectivism finds its sharpest articulation in the 
mouth of the doomed, saintly character Edward Hallin. Modelled 
on Toynbee, Hallin voices an argument for a qualified acceptance of 
individualistic economic liberalism that also takes moral and practical 
responsibility for its consequences. 
That Marcella’s individualist schemes involve a female exercising 
“free will” by acting upon altruistic “feeling” is significant, because 
the individualism central to mainstream political economy generally 
imagines the individual to be a male acting upon rational self-interest. 
This body of political-economic thought claims as its central analytical 
device homo economicus, or the rational actor motivated by self-interest. 
Negative accounts of political economy such as Ruskin’s tend to allege 
that the “soi-disant science” takes this economic man as a universal, 
comprehensive (and thus prescriptive, or at least enabling) model for 
human behaviour—as indeed many applications and vulgarized versions 
of it did and do (CW, 17:25). but Ruskin’s polemic disdain works to 
obscure the fact that key thinkers like Adam Smith and John Stuart 
Mill were both careful moralists quite aware of motivations other than 
self-interest. And in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, 
the idea of the self-interested rational actor was being productively 
complicated as understandings of consumer desire grew increasingly 
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sophisticated. Marshall was a part of these developments, not least 
in the overtly Ruskinian elements of his thinking; Keynes observed 
that “it was only through Ethics that he reached Economics.”48 One 
of Marshall’s chief emphases is that economic analysis must consider 
altruistic motives as it seeks to understand and predict human behav-
iours in the economic realm; in his Principles of Economics, he writes, 
“[E]thical forces are among those of which the economist has to take 
account. Attempts have indeed been made to construct an abstract 
science with regard to the actions of an ‘economic man,’ who is under 
no ethical influences and who pursues pecuniary gain warily and 
energetically, but mechanically and selfishly. but they have not been 
successful, nor even thoroughly carried out.”49 
Ward does not represent this cutting-edge economics that recog-
nizes altruistic motives; she represents the misguided “abstract 
science” that Marshall, presiding from his chair at Cambridge, aims to 
reform. Making (male) economics the province of self-interest allows 
her to make altruism the province of women. Marcella recognizes 
an “employers’ political economy” that assumes the self-interest of 
the individual and is concerned exclusively with maximizing profit; it 
associates this body of thought with a simple-minded manufacturer 
and with Conservative views (M, 461; see M, 323). Although the novel 
regards this political economy critically, it tends to present its prin-
ciples as true: the laws that classical political economy controversially 
defines as “natural” would seem to be so in the fictional world of the 
text, even though the narrator treats them with irony and even though 
the heroine sets herself against them. Marcella’s failure to understand 
the political-economic law that private self-interest may yield public 
good is one of the many markers of her immaturity in the first part 
of the book. She inhabits a world of economic laws that she rejects; 
even as she rejects those laws, her efforts to do good play out in a 
world governed by them, and her successes illustrate their truth. Ward 
suggests paradoxically that the laws of political economy are true, 
and that we need people to disagree with them. Gender resolves this 
paradox: male political economy must coexist with female resistance 
to political economy. And both the male practice of self-interest and 
the female practice of sympathy require an individualist politics that 
permits each of them to realize their respective tendencies. 
Marcella’s misunderstandings of economic law tend to come to 
the surface in discussions of consumption. Having viewed Aldous’s 
gorgeous home full of art treasures, she cries intemperately at him 
that the poor lack certain amenities “because you—we—have got too 
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much. You have the tapestry—and—and the pictures . . . and this 
wonderful house—and the park” (M, 127). Marcella’s statement about 
luxury consumption is an angry, ungrammatical outburst, but it is also a 
clear statement about causality: the poor must consume little, Marcella 
says, because the rich consume so much. The novel, however, suggests 
that this emotional impulse towards asceticism ignores fundamental 
economic law. Luxury spending, Ward implies, in fact aids the poor by 
driving demand for labour and goods, and thus improving the economy 
as a whole. Here she expresses a key argument from classical political 
economy: the self-interest of the rational actor, freely exercised in a 
marketplace, ultimately yields benefits for all. 
This logic appears in Marcella when we learn that at Maxwell Court 
luxury is a mode of philanthropy: “[T]he new drive was being made, 
and a piece of ornamental water enlarged and improved—mainly 
for the sake of giving employment in bad times” (M, 149). When 
Lady Winterbourne recounts that during a hard winter she asked her 
husband, out of deference to their impoverished tenants, to refrain 
from buying her “a new set of sables”; Aldous’s clever great aunt replies, 
“Well, my dear . . . if nobody bought sables, there’d be other poor 
people up in Russia, isn’t it?—or Hudson’s bay?—badly off. One has 
to think of that” (M, 128–29). Aldous gives this remark “only a slight 
smile,” for, we are told, he “had long ago left his great-aunt to work 
out her own economics” (129). but in an exchange later in the novel, 
Aldous’s economics would seem to resemble his great aunt’s rather 
closely. Marcella complains that the game-hunting of the aristocracy 
is a wasteful and damaging luxury. “You don’t think,” she asks Aldous, 
“that the country would be the better, if we could do away with game 
to-morrow? He replies: “No more than I think it would be better 
. . . if we could do away with gold plate and false hair tomorrow. There 
would be too many hungry goldsmiths and wig-makers on the streets” 
(M, 174). This argument for luxury consumption embraces the law that 
defines self-interest as the driving force of economic development and 
thus of social welfare.50 
Ward repeatedly casts Marcella as the person flouting such laws 
by choosing altruism over self-interest, and positions Aldous as the 
person who observes her mistakenly ignoring fundamental economic 
principles. Marcella organizes the village women in a straw-plaiting 
business in which she pays them above-market rate for their work. 
She admits that “of course, we don’t expect to pay our way”—and that 
she will be able to sell the product only because “there is a London 
shop Lady Winterbourne knows will take what they make if it turns 
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out well” (M, 156). Marcella reports to her mother that Aldous “thinks 
us economically unsound, of course. . . . So we are” (M, 157). When 
affairs in Marcella’s own life make her neglect their enterprise, Mrs 
Jellison, the most bold of the village women, confronts her about the 
matter, and decides to sell her wares to one Jimmy Gedge instead; as 
the old woman explains, “Ee’s a cheatin, sweatin, greedy old skinflint 
is Jimmy Gedge; but when yer wants ‘im yer kin find ‘im” (M, 282). 
Mrs. Jellison, the novel suggests, may know something about economics 
that Marcella does not: the market demand of self-interested rational 
actors is more reliable than the demand of an altruistic heiress, external 
to the market and dependent on personal whim. 
In the last of Marcella’s schemes to aid the poor, she develops 
the distinctly maternalist plan to open up the library on her estate 
to the tenants, planning to make of it a “village drawing room”; she 
will also restore cottages in the village and raise her laborers’ wages 
(M, 519). Once again, Marcella embodies an altruism that Aldous finds 
economically unsound: when he hears of the plan, we read, he “went 
through the objections that any economist would be sure to weigh against 
a proposal of the kind, as clearly as he could, and at some length—but 
without zest” (M, 524). Her project, we learn, requires her to sell railway 
shares in order to have ready money to spend on these improvements, 
and she acknowledges that her spending is a luxury: “I know there are 
not many people could do such a thing—other obligations would, must, 
come first” (M, 523). Marcella’s expensive altruistic projects are precisely 
the “irregular and individualistic experiments” that Ward defines as the 
corollary to collective strategies for social progress. Marcella uses her 
“free will” as an individual to spend private wealth gained via industrial 
capitalism. The novel points to both luxury consumption that is sensu-
ously gratifying (sables and gold plate) and luxury consumption that is 
philanthropic (improvements to cottages, subsidization for Ruskinian 
straw-plaiting schemes). In both instances, private spending stands 
as a means of addressing social ills that is consistent with the liberal 
individualism central to mainstream political economy.
This individualist account of politically and socially engaged 
consumption opposes the collectivist account offered by Webb, and 
thus intervenes in the contemporary conversation about the role of the 
state in addressing social ills. Ward’s revision of Webb’s collectivist vision 
for political consumption in Marcella seems relevant partly because we 
know that the Ward consulted Webb as she wrote the novel, seeking 
accuracy in her representation of the “Venturist Society,” based on the 
Fabian Society.51 Marcella’s work as a rent-collector, moreover, notably 
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parallels Webb’s own. When Ward was writing her novel in the early 
’90s, consumption as a political practice had gained fresh attention 
in the book that Marshall told Webb not to write, The History of 
the Consumer Co-operative Movement in Great Britain (1891). The 
book, Webb’s first, was a notable success, going into three editions; 
it surveyed the consumer cooperative movement that had thrived 
intermittently in britain since the late eighteenth century. Webb and 
the cooperative movement identify consumption as a site for political 
and social agency; Ward does too, but revises their collectivist vision, 
offering instead an individualist understanding of consumption as a site 
where the individual can exercise “free will” to do good, whether that 
good consists in providing wages and employment within a market or 
whether it consists in indulging in more capricious altruism. 
Marcella’s socially and politically engaged spending of wealth takes 
more from Ruskin’s economic thought than from the collectivist 
thinking that shapes Webb’s consumer cooperative movement. Ruskin 
too understands consumption as a crucial site for ethical behaviour; 
like his “perfect economist,” Marcella is the “mistress of a house” who 
strives to decisions about spending money according to the needs 
of the community rather than “selfishly” spending only according 
to her own desires, and in this respect she evokes a Ruskinian ideal 
(CW, 16:20). Her straw-plaiting scheme recalls Ruskin’s work with the 
Guild of St George, and her feeling that the poor have so little because 
the rich have so much echoes Ruskin’s zero-sum economic logic, which, 
in a wildly rebellious stroke, rejects the concept of extrinsic, unstable 
“value in exchange.”52 
If Marcella resembles the domestic, female “perfect economist” 
whom we encounter in Ruskin’s oppositional argument, Aldous—a 
reader of “recent numbers of various economic journals, English and 
foreign”—resembles an economist who might be a part of the emerging 
professionalized academic discipline in which Marshall figured so 
centrally (M, 89). Ward, however, offers a more sharply gendered vision 
of economic ethics than does Ruskin. Ruskin’s female “perfect econo-
mist” is a rhetorical device in an argument significantly concerned with 
the male’s obligation to feel and to act ethically in matters of economic 
production and consumption: his “mistress of a house” figures in a text 
that is also preoccupied with the moral responsibilities of the master. 
Although Aldous, as a master, has virtues consistent with a Ruskinian 
paternalistic morality, Marcella suggests that progress depends on the 
coexistence and cooperation of two distinct gendered types: more 
overtly than Ruskin’s, Ward’s master requires a mistress in order to 
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act ethically in the realm of economics. This gendering involves a 
flattening on both sides: it removes expertise and the “drudgery” of 
sustained rational intellectual labor from the feminine repertoire, and 
it also denies the masculine realm of contemporary professionalized 
economics its actual interest in ethics and altruism. 
As the novel draws to its close, Marcella thinks: “It was not the least 
probable that he and she, with their differing temperaments, would 
think alike in the future, any more than in the past. She would always 
be for experiments, for risks, which his critical temper, his larger brain, 
would of themselves be slow to enter upon. Yet she knew well enough 
that in her hands they would become bearable and even welcome to 
him” (M, 538).53 In Marcella, these gendered habits of mind comple-
ment each other: the female contributes speed and action in the form 
of a morally charged impulsiveness, while the male contributes a slow 
caution borne of intellectual girth.54 This is precisely the cooperative 
relationship between women and men that Ward describes in the 
“Appeal,” which declares: “The quickness to feel, the willingness to 
lay aside prudential considerations in a right cause, which are amongst 
the peculiar excellencies of women, are in their right place when they 
are used to influence the more highly trained and developed judge-
ment of men.”55 (Marshall expresses similar ideas when he writes 
in an undated fragment: “women are quicker to perceive and more 
strengthful to feel than men; but . . . on average, they have less power 
of sustained concentration.”)56 With “his larger brain,” Aldous offers 
prudent slowness and the careful economist’s “trained and specialized 
knowledge”; with her impulsiveness and instinctive sensitivity to others’ 
pain, Marcella brings a readiness to act that is crucial in the context of 
transition, where pliancy and experimentation are the only ways forward.
Ward’s passing reference to Aldous’s brain evokes the Darwinian 
body of thought that understands women to be less intellectually 
capable than men.57 but Ward suggests that the incomprehensions 
of Marcella’s apparently smaller brain have distinct value. Just as 
Marcella’s impulsiveness makes a productive complement to Aldous’s 
caution, her ignorance is a fine partner for his knowledge. Aldous 
perceives this early in the novel when he writes to Hallin: “A large 
and passionate humanity plays about her. What she says often seems to 
me foolish—in the ear; but the inner sense, the heart of it, command 
me” (M, 91–92). When Marcella tells her mother that Aldous finds 
the straw-plaiting plan “economically unsound,” she adds: “All care 
for the human being under the present state of things is economically 
unsound . . . he likes it no more than I do” (M, 157). Aldous dislikes 
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human suffering; but his knowledge and his analytical intelligence make 
him slow and cautious. He tells Marcella: “I am not sure . . . That is 
always my difficulty, you know” (M, 174). Marcella, in her passionate 
humanity and her foolishness, is unencumbered by the uncertainties 
that analysis and knowledge inevitably generate: she moves directly 
to experiment and action. Economic expertise belongs to the man; 
but to the woman belongs the “feeling,” the irrepressible urge to care 
immediately for people in need. Each of these assets is incomplete 
and ineffective on its own; married together, they can fruitfully work 
to solve the problem of poverty. 
Marcella’s treatment of economic questions, then, is also ultimately a 
statement about marriage. Hallin is an economist who achieves within 
himself a union of the urge to care for humans with the possession 
of knowledge, but he is a character marked for death. The union of 
altruism and expertise that survives is a union of man and wife. The 
novel concludes with a marriage that conforms to Marshall’s Ruskinian 
vision of “contrast” and complementarity. Marcella’s humiliating realiza-
tion of her own ignorance in Aldous’s library is resolved in the novel’s 
happy ending, but it is resolved largely because she grows out of a 
childish brashness into a mature awareness of her ignorances. The 
problem of her inadequate economic education is not solved by further 
study and learning; it is solved by her union with a larger brain. Her 
economic education completes itself only when she marries.
One of the first major contributions to economic theory by a woman 
within professionalized academe was Joan Robinson’s Economics of 
Imperfect Competition (1933). There is an oft-repeated story that 
Robinson encountered the elderly Mary Paley Marshall at a Cambridge 
garden party shortly after that book’s quite successful debut. Mary, the 
story goes, embraced Joan, “warmly congratulating her and saying, 
sternly, that when she saw Alfred (dead then for nine years), she would 
tell him that he was wrong to say that women could not do economic 
theory.”58 The circulation of this unverified story in work by historians 
of economic thought expresses a wish, one born of the knowledge that 
even if women could do economic theory, the twentieth century was 
one in which many of them did not, and in which economics would 
become “the most male of the social sciences.” Read with an eye to 
that future, Ward’s Marcella helps us to understand that for those who 
struggled to define the “perfect economist” as male, that struggle was 
largely a matter of securing the affections of the home and the safety 
of the empire. 
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